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ARTICLES
THE POPES AND THE ECONOMY*
FRANCIS CANAVAN S.J.1
Papal doctrine on political economy has long been misun-
derstood as well as mistrusted among those economic liberals
who in the United States have the curious habit of calling them-
selves conservatives. I propose here to examine this doctrine in
the fullness of its articulation over the century between Rerum
Novarum2 in 1891 and Centesimus Annus' in 1991, not so much in
order to defend it as to bring at least some clarity about what it is
and what it is not.
I will use six papal encyclicals, beginning with Leo XIIi's
Rerum Novarum4 which was followed by Quadragesimo Anno,' pub-
lished by Pius XI, as its title indicates, forty years later in 1931; by
Mater et Magistra6 of John XXIII in 1961; Populorum Progressio7 of
Paul VI in 1967; and Sollicitudo Rei Socialis' ofJohn Paul II in 1987,
and his Centesimus Annus.9 Other documents could of course be
included. But these six form a self-conscious series, in which
each of them- after the first one, begins by referring to its prede-
cessors, and claims to build upon and develop them in a consis-
tent body of social teaching. Developments in doctrine there
* Originally published in FIRST THINGS. Francis Canavan, The Popes and
the Economy, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1991, at 35.
1. Francis Canavan, S.J., is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at
Fordham University and author of Edmund Burke: Prescription and Providence, Pins
in the Liberal Balloon, The Political Economy of Edmund Burke, and The Pluralist
Game.
2. LEO XIII, RERUM NOVARUM (1891), reprinted in 2 TiH PAPAL
ENCYCLICALS, 241 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1981).
3. JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMus ANNUS (1991).
4. RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 2.
5. Pius XI, QUADRAGEsIMO ANNo (1931), reprinted in 3 TIHE PAPAL
ENCYCLOPEDIAS, supra note 2, at 415.
6. JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGISTRA (1961), reprinted in 5 THE PAPAL
ENCYCLICALS, supra note 2, at 59.
7. PAUL VI, POPULORUM PROGRESSIO (1967), reprinted in id at 183.
8. JOHN PAUL II, SOLLIcrrUDo REI SoCiAuis (1987).
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certainly have been; for example, the earlier encyclicals contem-
plate national, and particularly European, economies, while
those written after World War II think in global terms, address
the problems of the recently independent and economically
underdeveloped countries of the Third World, and elaborate a
theory of development. It can also be said that John Paul II has a
more positive view of the free market than his immediate prede-
cessors. Nevertheless, none of these encyclicals is a break with or
a repudiation of the previous ones. I shall therefore feel justified
in treating them as a unified body of teaching, the parts of which
can be cited in support of the same basic set of principles over
the course of a century.
The most basic of these principles are derived from the
Catholic doctrines of creation and redemption. God created the
universe out of nothing. It therefore reflects and participates in
His truth and goodness. The created universe is a vastly different
place from the uncreated and ultimately meaningless universe of
post-Christian modernity. (The world that God made is there-
fore much less suited to a purely mechanistic theory of econom-
ics.) On the face of this earth, man is the highest of all creatures
because, intelligent and capable of free choice, he is the image
and likeness of God and is, furthermore, redeemed and made a
sharer in God's own life by Jesus Christ.
From this view of man and the world, it follows, in the words
of John XXIII, "that individual men are necessarily the founda-
tion, cause, and end of all social institutions."' 0 "We are refer-
ring," the pope explains, "to human beings insofar as they are
social by nature and raised to an order of existence that tran-
scends and subdues nature."1 Society exists for man, and man
finds his meaning and purposes in God.
There is therefore a certain individualism in Catholic
thought. Paul VI explains:
In the design of God, every man is called upon to develop
and fulfill himself, for every life is a vocation.... Endowed
with intelligence and freedom, he is responsible for his ful-
fillment, as he is for his salvation. He is aided, or some-
times impeded, by those who educate him and those with
whom he lives, but each one remains . . . the principal
agent of his own success or failure. By the unaided effort
of his own intelligence and his will, each man can grow in
10. MAThR ET MAGISTRA, supra note 6, at para. 219.
11. Id.
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humanity, can enhance his personal worth, can become
more a person.
1 2
It goes without saying that, in these words, the pope does
not deny or question man's dependence on God's grace, but
means only that ultimately each of us, and not society, makes or
breaks himself. Here we have a rejection of collectivism and of
every form of totalitarianism which reduces the individual to a
mere cell in the body of society. At the same time we are urged
to reject the atomistic individualism of liberal thought, which
explains society as a collection of individuals banded together for
the protection of their private rights and interests. As John Paul
I puts it, "the transcendent reality of the human being . . . is
seen to be shared from the beginning by a couple, a man and a
woman .... and is therefore fundamentally social." 3
We may remark without facetiousness that this last statement
is pregnant with vast implications. Man is by nature, and not by
choice, social because society grows out of the division of the
sexes, their union, and the families that result. Community is as
natural to man as is individuality. Justice therefore is not merely
a regulator of contractual relations among individuals. It also
governs the relationship among human beings that flow from
their destiny to live in a community with a true common good
which "embraces the sum total of those conditions of social living
whereby men are enabled more fully and more readily to achieve
their own perfection."1 4 Nature thus establishes a distributive
and a social justice, as well as the commutative justice that gov-
erns exchange relations such as buying and selling.
Catholic social doctrine rests on certain theological prem-
ises. Not only that, it must be understood as being a theology
rather than a political or economic program. Its function is to
state the God-given goals of human life, social as well as individ-
ual, the basic moral guidelines for achieving those goals, and the
moral boundaries that must not be violated in striving for our
more immediate ends. John Paul II has therefore been able to
say: "The Church's social doctrine is not a 'third way' between
liberal capitalism and Marxist collectivism, nor even a possible
alternative to other solutions less radically opposed to one
another.... Nor is it an ideology, but rather.., belongs to the
field ... of theology and particularly of moral theology."15 It was
from this moral-theological point of view that he criticized "both
12. POPULORUM PROGRESSIO, supra note 7, at para. 15.
13. SotaicrruDo REI SoMALIS, supra note 8, at para. 29.
14. MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra note 6, at para. 65.
15. SoLLicrrUDo Rmi SocALis, supra note 8, at para. 41.
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liberal capitalism and Marxist collectivism" as "two concepts of
the development of individuals and peoples, both concepts being
imperfect and in need of radical correction."' 6
Which was not to say, as many commentators leapt to
assume, that he regarded them as morally equivalent. What he
meant becomes clearer in his more recent encyclical where he
says that the "affluent" or "consumer" society made a radical mis-
take when it sought to defeat Marxism on the level of pure mate-
rialism by showing how a free-market society could achieve a
greater satisfaction of material human needs than Communism,
while at the same time excluding spiritual values. 7 The con-
sumer society thus thereby "totally reduces man to the sphere of
economics and the satisfaction of material needs."18 To the
extent that capitalism degenerates into mere consumerism, it is
as materialistic as Marxism. But capitalism need not degenerate
in this way, though it is always in danger of doing so and is there-
fore in need of moral correction and the development of virtues
in its citizens.
Since Marxism is progressively collapsing all over the world
and can no longer be taken seriously as the wave of the future, it
is not necessary here to expound in detail the popes' criticism of
it. If there is a wave of the future, it seems to be capitalism. For
that reason, what the popes have had to say about capitalism is
more interesting and relevant to our concerns.
What, then, is capitalism, as these documents understand it?
Pius XI said that Leo XIII, in his encyclical, "had chiefly in mind
that economic regime in which were provided by different peo-
ple the capital and labor jointly needed for production. " "
According to Leo XIII, "nature has commanded in the case of
the State that these two classes.., should properly form equally
balanced counterparts to each other. Each needs the other com-
pletely: neither capital can do without labor, nor labor without
capital."2 ° The popes, therefore, have accepted capitalism
understood as an economic system in which some people own
capital goods and others work with those goods in a joint process
of production to be carried on in a spirit of collaboration, not of
exploitation and class warfare. Their criticisms are aimed at the
abuses of capitalism, not at the system as such.
Pius XI explained:
16. Id. at para. 21.
17. CEN rEISMUS ANNus, supra note 3, at para. 19.
18. Id.
19. QuADRGcEsIMo ANNO, supra note 5, at para. 48-49.
20. RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 2, at para. 28.
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Leo XIII's whole endeavor was to adjust this economic
regime to the standards of true order; whence it follows
that the system itself is not to be condemned. And surely it
is not vicious of its very nature; but it violates right order
whenever capital so employs the working or wage-earning
classes as to divert business and economic activity entirely
to its own arbitrary will and advantage, without any regard
to the human dignity of the workers, the social character of
economic life, social justice, and the common good.'
Similar criticisms of capitalism are found throughout the
encyclicals. Perhaps the clearest and most succinct of them
occurs in Paul VI's Populorum Progressio, where he condemns "[a]
type of capitalism" (described as "unchecked liberalism"), which
"considers profit as the key motive for economic progress, compe-
tition as the supreme law of economics, and private ownership of
the means of production as an absolute right that has no limits and
carries no corresponding social obligation" (emphasis added).2 2
I have heard this and other papal statements rejected as attacks
on a straw man, since no one advocates that kind of capitalism.
This criticism would be easier to accept, however, if conservative
editorialists in this country did not so often talk as if they
believed in the unchecked economic liberalism that Paul VI
described and if they did not reprobate any modification of it as
socialism. Be that as it may, this is the kind of capitalism to which
the popes object in their encyclicals.
They do not propose socialism as its remedy, nor do they
suggest doing away with private property or the market economy.
"Without abolishing the competitive market," said Paul VI (and
he spoke for all the popes), "it should be kept within the limits
which make it just and moral, and therefore human."23 As for
private property, Catholic social doctrine not only does not con-
demn it, but emphatically affirms it. If anything, the popes want
more of it, more widely spread, and could cheerfully accept what
was once the slogan of Britain's Conservative Party, "a property-
owning democracy."
Leo XIII argued at length that private property was a natural
and socially necessary right,24 and went so far as to say that "the
right of private property must be regarded as sacred."2 5 Property
is the spur to industry and the source of wealth: "If incentives to
21. QuADRAGEsiMo ANNO, supra note 5, at para. 49.
22. POPULORUM PROGR.SSIO, supra note 7, at para. 26.
23. Id. at para. 61.
24. RERUM NovARuM, supra note 2, at para. 9-23.
25. Id. at para. 65.
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ingenuity and skill in individual persons were to be abolished,
the very fountains of wealth would necessarily dry up."26 Fur-
thermore, property is the bulwark of the basic institution of soci-
ety, the family, which a father can only protect and provide for
"by owning fruitful goods to transmit by inheritance to his
children."27
Seventy years later, in 1961, John XXIII took note of the argu-
ments which certain writers had advanced to suggest that in a
modern and developed economy, where most people depend on
their skills and draw their income from their jobs, private prop-
erty was no longer important. But he rejected those arguments,
saying, "The right of private property, including that pertaining
to goods devoted to productive enterprises, is permanently
valid. 2
8
Papal social thought acknowledges and defends the right of
private property, but does not regard it as unconditioned and
absolute. In the Christian scheme of things, property is steward-
ship. Man has the right to own and use it, but in subordination
to God's purposes, not merely his own. The earth is God's, for
He made it, and He made it for the sustenance and development
of the whole human race. The division of the earth into private
possessions is meant to benefit all mankind, and is justified
because, in addition to private interests, "it does not cease to
serve the common interests of all."29
"The right to own private property," said Pius XI, "has been
given to man by nature, or rather by the Creator Himself, not
only in order that individuals may be able to provide for their
own needs and those of their families, but also that by means of
it, the goods which the Creator has destined for the human race
may truly serve this purpose." ° It follows that, in the use of
property, "Men must take into account.., not only their own
advantage, but also the common good. To define in details these
duties, when the need occurs and when the natural law does not
do so, is the function of the government." 1
The quarrel that apologists for liberal capitalism have had
with Catholic social thought is not that the popes deny the right
of private property or the usefulness of the market, since in fact
they do not do that. It is rather that the popes do not believe
that the common interest of society is adequately served by the
26. Id. at para. 22.
27. Id. at para. 20.
28. MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra note 6, at para. 109.
29. RERuM NovARuM, supra note 2, at para. 14.
30. QUADRAGESimO Argo, supra note 5, at para. 23.
31. Id. at para. 25.
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profit motive and market forces alone, but requires some degree
of governmental regulation and management of the economy.
At the time when Rerum Novarum5 2 was written, said John
XXIII in Mater et Magistra,
an opinion widely prevailed and was commonly put into
practice, according to which, in economic matters, every-
thing was to be attributed to inescapable natural forces.
Hence it was held that no connection existed between eco-
nomic and moral laws. Therefore, those engaged in eco-
nomic activity need look no farther than to their own gain.
Consequently, mutual relations between economic agents
could be left to the play of free and unregulated competi-
tion. Interest on capital, prices of goods and services, prof-
its and wages, were to be determined purely mechanically
by the laws of the marketplace. Every precaution was to be
taken lest the civil authority intervene in any way in eco-
nomic affairs.3
3
Pope John XXIII acknowledged later in his encyclical that signifi-
cant changes had taken place in capitalist societies since 1891."4
Standards of living and education had risen, systems of social
security were common, there was more popular participation in
public life, greater social mobility, and a decline in class divi-
sions. Liberalism as an economic theory remained alive, how-
ever, and, as before, was based on a mechanistic theory of the
nature of the world and of human society, a view of the universe
as a vast machine operating automatically to produce the right
and best results (which might be those of social Darwinism). The
results, therefore, did not have to be intended by human intelli-
gence, and any effort to plan them could only prevent or mar
them.
The popes have steadfastly rejected this view, either of the
universe or of an economic system modeled on it. They admit-
ted that there are laws of economics: "The so-called laws of eco-
nomics, derived from the nature of earthly goods and from the
qualities of the human body and soul, determine what aims are
unattainable or attainable in economic matters, and what means
are thereby necessary." But these laws, valid though they are
within their limits, are not independent of or superior to the
moral law, which sets the higher ends of life, and to which partic-
ular economic aims must be subordinated.3 5 For example, if it is
32. RERuM NOVARUM, supra note 2.
33. MATER ET MACISTRA, supra note 6, at para. 11.
34. Id. at paras. 47-49.
35. QUADRAGESIMO AqNmo, supra note 5, at paras. 21-22.
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economically unfeasible for employers to pay a living wage for
labor because of the prevailing conditions of competition, we
should change the conditions of competition. This can be done
by setting a legal minimum wage, by making collective bargain-
ing legally obligatory, by encouraging cooperation among
associations of employers and employees, by labor participation
in management or by still other means that are not beyond the
reach of human intelligence.
The Catholic mind is a synthesizing mind that seeks to unify
all aspects of reality and all the areas of human knowledge in a
coherent world view. Such a mind runs the risk of producing
what Reinhold Niebuhr called "a presumptuous claim of final-
ity," that is, a final answer to the problem of society that is really
only an incomplete one. But if we are not to allow economic
forces to run wild in the fond hope that nature, as by an invisible
hand, will direct them to the good of the community, we must try
to bring it about that "particular economic aims, whether of soci-
ety as a body or of individuals, will be intimately linked with the
universal teleological order" created by God. 6
The liberal mind, atomistic and mechanistic as it is, con-
stantly detaches means from ends and turns them into ends in
themselves. In our doctrine of freedom of speech, for example,
"expression" becomes its own end, to be pursued and protected
without regard to the ends for which a rational and free people
might have intended to guarantee it constitutional protection.
Similarly, economic productivity and efficiency become ends in
themselves, to be pursued without limit. It is against this that the
Church protests. As Paul VI said:
Every programme made to increase production has, in the
last analysis, no other raison d'etre than the service of
man .... It is not sufficient to increase wealth for it to be
distributed equitably. It is not sufficient to promote tech-
nology to render the world a more human place in which
to live .... Economics and technology have no meaning
except from man, whom they should serve. And man is
only truly man insofar as, master of his own acts and judge
of their worth, he is author of his own advancement, in
keeping with the nature which was given him by his Crea-
tor, and whose possibilities and exigencies he himself
freely assumes.3 7
Catholic individualism differs from liberal individualism pre-
cisely in that it looks to our common human nature as created by
36. QuADRAGESIMO ANio, supra note 5, at para. 22.
37. POPULORUM PROGRSSIO, supra note 7, at para. 34.
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God for the obligatory norms of human action. Therefore, as
Paul VI also said, faced with a rapidly developing world, we must
ask what the goals of development are, and we must look for the
answer in a new, complete, and transcendent humanism that
aims at "the fully-rounded development of the whole man and all
men" and "is open to the Absolute and is conscious of a vocation
which gives human life its true meaning."" s Since this is the lan-
guage of theology, it may seem remote from the practical con-
cerns of economics, but it offers an answer to a question that
economics on its own cannot answer: What is economic develop-
ment for?
The reader will have noticed the considerable emphasis that
the encyclicals put on freedom and self-development, both indi-
vidual and social. It found classic expression in the principle of
subsidiarity formulated by Pius XI:
Just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and com-
mit to the community at large what private enterprise and
industry can accomplish, so, too, it is an injustice, a grave
evil, and a disturbance of right order for a larger and
higher organization to arrogate to itself functions which
can be performed by smaller and lower bodies .... Of its
very nature the true aim of all social activity should be to
help individual members of the social body, but never to
destroy or absorb them. 39
This is a purely formal principle that does not answer sub-
stantive questions. To illustrate by way of example, consider the
Golden Rule, which tells us not to do unto others what we do not
want them to do to us. The rule does not tell us what we don't
want others to do to us; that is something we must decide for
ourselves. In like manner, the principle of subsidiarity tells us
that it is wrong to assign to a larger and higher organization func-
tions that smaller and lower bodies can perform sufficiently well,
but it does not tell us what those functions are. Nor can it do so
in the abstract, since the judgment on them will necessarily vary
with circumstances and changing conditions. Yet the principle is
neither meaningless nor useless, because it inculcates a steady
bias toward decentralization, freedom, and initiative.
John Paul II has restated this bias in a passage obviously
directed against socialist bureaucraticism:
It should be noted that in today's world ... the right of
initiative is often suppressed. Yet it is a right which is
38. Id. at paras. 16, 20, 42.
39. QUADRAGESIMO ANNo, supra note 5, at para. 40.
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important not only for the individual good, but also for the
common good. Experience shows that the denial of this
right, or its limitation in the name of an alleged "equality"
of everyone in society, diminishes, or in practice absolutely
destroys the spirit of initiative, that is to say, the creative
subjectivity of the citizen. As a consequence, there arises,
not so much a true equality as a "leveling down." In the
place of creative initiative there appears passivity, depen-
dence, and submission to the bureaucratic apparatus
which, as the only "ordering" and "decision-making" body
- if not also the "owner" - of the entire totality of goods
and the means of production, puts everyone in a position
of almost absolute dependence, which is similar to the
traditional dependence of the worker-proletarian in
capitalism.
4 °
He returned to this theme in more detail in Centesimus
Annus, where he said:
The social order will be all the more stable, the more it...
does not place in opposition personal interest and the
interests of society as a whole, but rather seeks ways to
bring them into fruitful harmony. In fact, where self-inter-
est is violently suppressed, it is replaced by a burdensome
system of bureaucratic control which dries up the well-
springs of initiative and creativity.
41
John Paul II has acknowledged that the state may perform a
substitute function by aiding "social sectors or business systems"
when they "are too weak or are just getting under way, and are
not equal to the task at hand."42 But such interventions are justi-
fied only by urgent considerations of the common good. They
therefore "must be as brief as possible" in order to avoid taking
from society's institutions "the functions which are properly
theirs," with the result of "enlarging excessively the sphere of
state intervention to the detriment of both economic and civil
freedom."4"
He goes on to say that in recent years such state interven-
tions have vastly expanded and have created what is called the
Welfare State or the Social Assistance State. Beneficial and nec-
essary though some of these state activities have been, extended
beyond the bounds of necessity, they violate the principle of sub-
sidiarity and harm society:
40. SoLLcaTUDo RA SocALIs, supra note 8, at para. 15.
41. CENTESIMUS ANNus, supra note 3, at para. 25.
42. Id. at para. 48.
43. Id.
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By intervening directly and depriving society of its respon-
sibility, the Social Assistance State leads to a loss of human
energies and an inordinate increase of public agencies,
which are dominated more by bureaucratic ways of think-
ing than by concern for serving their clients, and which are
accompanied by an enormous increase in spending. 44
In addition to the expansion of a bureaucracy of welfare
administrators, there is also the danger of creating a class of wel-
fare dependents and other beneficiaries of government expendi-
tures, not all of them poor by any means, who come to look upon
their benefits as entitlements.
For these reasons John Paul II has praised private economic
enterprise in tones more enthusiastic than we have been accus-
tomed to hear in papal documents:
Many goods cannot be adequately produced through the
work of an isolated individual; they require the coopera-
tion of many people in working towards a common goal.
Organizing such a productive effort, planning its duration
in time, making sure that it corresponds in a positive way to
the demands which it must satisfy, and taking the necessary
risks - all this too is a source of wealth in today's society.
In this way, the role of disciplined and creative human
work and, as an essential part of that work, initiative and
entrepreneurial ability becomes increasingly evident and
decisive.45
"It would appear," he continues, "that, on the level of indi-
vidual nations and of international relations, the free market is
the most efficient instrument for utilizing resources and effec-
tively responding to needs."46 The efficiency of the market is
limited, however, to "those needs which are 'solvent,' insofar as
they are endowed with purchasing power," and to "those
resources which are 'marketable,' insofar as they are capable of
obtaining a satisfactory price. But there are many human needs
which find no place on the market."47 At this point, the
demands ofjustice take precedence over the market, and require
us "not to allow fundamental human needs to remain unsatis-
fied, and not to allow those burdened by such needs to perish."4 8
John Paul II's judgment on capitalism is a balanced one.
While he puts heavier emphasis on the virtues of capitalism than
44. Id.
45. CENrSLus ANNus, supra note 3, at para. 32.
46. Id. at para. 34.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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his predecessor had done, he does not disagree with them. He
answers the question whether, after the collapse of Marxist
regimes, we can take capitalism as a model in these words:
If by "capitalism" is meant an economic system which rec-
ognizes the fundamental and positive role of business, the
market, private property, and the resulting responsibility
for the means of production, as well as free human creativ-
ity in the economic sector, then the answer is certainly in
the affirmative, even though it would perhaps be more
appropriate to speak of a "business economy," "market
economy," or simply "free economy." But if by "capitalism"
is meant a system in which freedom in the economic sector
is not circumscribed within a strong juridical framework
which places it at the service of human freedom in its total-
ity, and which sees it as a particular aspect of that freedom,
the core of which is ethical and religious, then the reply is
certainly negative.49
In plainer English, John Paul II condemns the "unchecked liber-
alism"50 that Paul VI had condemned.
The encyclicals see the energies of society as flowing from
below upwards, not from the top down. They see human society
as a community of communities (or "intermediary bodies"), not
as a collection of individuals who have contracted with each
other to set up a mutual-protection association called the state.
They see social cooperation as being more in accord with human
nature and its true needs than the conflict and class warfare to
which our fallen nature is so prone. They are well aware, how-
ever, that attempts to create an ideal world based on spontane-
ous collaboration, without private property, state, or law, are
bound to fail, as communism has in fact failed. They therefore
favor a self-organization of society, beginning with the family
through higher and higher levels of associations - industrial,
agricultural, labor, educational, cultural, etc. - with the state at
the top performing an essentially coordinating role.
In such a society, said John XXIII, the state is to be the agent
that "encourages, stimulates, regulates, supplements, and com-
plements.""' The result is an economy that is largely privately
owned and privately operated, but regulated and to some extent
managed, as the American economy in fact is. It will have a place
for the market, but not the highest place because the common
good must be intended; it will not happen solely as the result of
49. CENTEsIMus ANNus, supra note 3, at para. 42.
50. POPUtLORUM PROGRESSIO, supra note 7, at para. 26.
51. MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra note 6, at para. 53.
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the free play of forces in the market. It is the duty of the state to
see to it that it is intended. This is not to be done, however, by
central planning fashioned and administered by a national or
international bureaucracy. Rather, the popes propose that it be
done with as widespread participation as possible by all the
organized sectors of society. Social action for the common good
can be the work of private bodies or the public authorities. Ide-
ally, it will be a collaboration between them, in accordance with
the principle of subsidiarity.
Rerum Novarum5 2 and Quadragesimo Anno5" were concerned
primarily with the reform of advanced capitalist economies.
Their major objectives included the moderation of class warfare,
the guarantee of the right of workers to organize, payment of
wages on which working men could support their families in
decent comfort, and legislation to improve working conditions in
the factories. They also urged action to establish a just balance
between wages and prices, to spread the ownership of property
more widely among the people, and to give workers a share in
the ownership and management of enterprises. They favored
putting checks on the economic and political power of the rich,
not in order to give the victory in the class war to the poor, but to
give both sides a stake in the economy that would let them
regard each other as partners rather than adversaries.
The later encyclicals broadened their scope. Mater et Magis-
tra,54 for example, addressed the question of helping the agricul-
tural areas of a country to keep up with the pace of development
in the industrial areas. John XXIII called here for a vigorous
exercise of state authority: "To achieve orderly progress in vari-
ous sectors of economic life, it is absolutely necessary that as
regards agriculture, public authorities give heed and take action
in the following matters: taxes and duties, credit, insurance,
prices, the fostering of requisite skills, and finally, improved
equipment for rural enterprises."55 Some of these things the fed-
eral and state governments in this country have done (and some-
times overdone) for decades.
Paul VI urged international efforts for balanced develop-
ment on a world scale:
There can be no progress towards the complete develop-
ment of man without the simultaneous development of all
humanity in the spirit of solidarity .... This duty is the
52. RERUM NovAum, supra note 2.
53. QUADRAGESIMO ANlo, supra note 5.
54. MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra note 6.
55. Id. at para. 131.
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concern especially of better-off nations. Their obligations
stem from a brotherhood that is at once human and super-
natural.... We must repeat once more that the superflu-
ous wealth of rich countries should be placed at the service
of poor nations.
56
The practical policies that he advocated to carry this exhortation
into practice included such measures as jointly planned multilat-
eral programs of aid, the management of international debts,
and equity in trade relations.
These and other proposals are the point at which morality
approaches policy. I said above that what the popes offer is a
moral theology rather than a political and economic program.
There is, however, no sharp line between morals on the one
hand and politics and economics on the other. Moraljudgments
shade into political and economic judgments. -The practical
judgments of politics and economics are never exempt from
moral judgment. But the application of moral principles to prac-
tice becomes more and more conditioned and variable as more
lessons of experience, information on present facts, and calcula-
tions of future results are fed into our political and economic
decisions. As John XXIII said in another of his encyclicals, Pacem
in Terris.
We deem it opportune to point out how difficult it is to
understand clearly the relation between the objective
requirements ofjustice and concrete situations, namely, to
define the degrees and forms in which doctrinal principles
and directives ought to be applied to reality. And the defi-
nitions of those degrees and forms is all the more difficult
in our times, which are marked by a pronounced dyna-
mism. For this reason, the problem of bringing social real-
ity into line with the objective requirements ofjustice is a
problem which will never admit of a definite solution.5 7
There are objective requirements of justice, and we can
know them well enough to find guidance and to recognize our
moral obligations in them. But, beyond a certain point, their
application to practice becomes a matter of practical judgment
and prudence, and is the very stuff of politics, about which even
the wise and the good, as well as the stupid and the selfish, can
and will differ. "For you know," as Edmund Burke said, "that the
decisions of prudence (contrary to the system of the insane rea-
soners) ... almost all. . . are determined on the more or the less,
56. POPULORUM PROGRESSIO, supra note 7, at paras. 43, 44, 49.
57. JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS paras. 154-55 (1963) reprinted in 5 THE
PMAL ENCvCuCAiS 107 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1981).
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the earlier or the later, and on a balance of advantage and incon-
venience, of good and evil."
It therefore behooves all of us not to claim to know more
than we do know. We do not live in a world in which all judg-
ments can be reduced to mathematical certainties. To the doc-
trinaire mind, the needle on the gauge always stands at either
zero or 180 degrees, because there is no scientifically demonstra-
ble reason why it should stop at any particular one of the 179
degrees in between. Such a mind, however, is peculiarly
unsuited to making political judgments, which are affected by
what Burke called "the unavoidable uncertainty, as to the effect,
which attends on every measure of human prudence."
In dealing with economics and politics, we are not ordinarily
confronted with stark either-or choices, but with choices between
more or less and questions of how, when, where, by what means,
and with what probable effects. We have to decide, not merely
whether government should act, but how much or how little, and
in what way. We must ask, therefore, what are the limits of the
free market, within which it will in fact operate for the good of
the whole community. That we seldom know with certainty what
the right answer is does not mean that we can avoid making deci-
sions about policy.
A good rule of thumb would be, when in doubt, do not
intervene, because every government intervention in the econ-
omy politicizes economic decisions and subjects them to self-
interested and short-sighted political pressures. But that is only
half the story. The other half is that the defenders of capitalism
should stop preaching it as an ideology that enjoys the certainty
of a demonstrative science and should recognize it for what it is.
That is, an existing and functioning economic system that has
changed markedly in the past, can change again, and is con-
stantly in need of adjustment to meet the basic requirements of
justice for all the members of society.
The free market is useful, even (if you insist) very useful,
and certainly more so than a command economy. But that is all
it is: useful. The profit motive motivates men to seek profit, but
that is all it does. It can inspire them to make office furniture or
to peddle pornography, and if profit is their only motive, they
will do whichever brings in the most profit. It is very easy - too
easy - to point to the instances in which government interven-
tion in the economy has been ineffective or counterproductive.
But it would be much more difficult - I would say impossible -
to prove that the free market always does a better job than gov-
ernment in solving society's problems or satisfying human needs,
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or that competition alone produces a better social order than
solidarity and cooperation.
In a conversation I once had with a Hungarian colleague, I
remarked how tragic it was that a record harvest in the Soviet
Union was going to waste because the Soviet government could
not distribute it properly to its people. "Americans take for
granted," he replied, "what a large part of the world does not
have - good roads." Just so; our continent-wide economy
depends heavily on a magnificent highway system. Does anyone
seriously object to the fact that the highways are government
property and are built and maintained out of taxes? Certainly
the trucking industry does not. And do we really expect free
enterprise to protect us from water and air pollution, or from the
urban and suburban sprawl that uncontrolled real-estate devel-
opment produces?
As for satisfying our needs, the market cannot distinguish
among human needs, human tastes, and human vices. It caters
indiscriminately to all of them because, in an economic view,
they are all indifferently "demands." As John Paul II explains,
Of itself, an economic system does not possess criteria for
correctly distinguishing new and higher forms of satisfying
human needs from artificial new needs which hinder the
formation of a mature personality. Thus a great deal of
educational and cultural work is urgently needed, includ-
ing the education of consumers in the responsible use of
their power of choice, the formation of a strong sense of
responsibility among producers and among people in the
mass media in particular, as well as the necessary interven-
tion by public authorities."
We would seem, therefore, to have some use for moral gui-
dance in our political economy, and that is what the popes offer
us. Whether and to what extent we should accept it is a matter
that we may discuss and debate in our political forums. But to
reject it out of hand because it is morality and not economics is
to fall back into the liberal individualism that is currently the
greatest weakness of both our economic and political systems.
58. CENaiSlMus A,'mNus, supra note 3, at para. 36.
